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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Has the Appellant satisfied its obligation on appeal to marshal the 
evidence in support of the Order of the Utah Labor Commission and show that, despite 
supporting facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom that the 
Findings are not supported by substantial evidence? 
Standard of Review: The appropriate standard of review for a formal adjudicative 
hearing is found in the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, §63-
46b-16(4)(g) (1988) which provides that: 
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial relief has been substantially prejudiced 
by any of the following: 
# * # 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied 
by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record before the court; 
The Appellant is challenging the factual findings of the Utah Labor Commission stating 
that those findings are not supported by substantial evidence. The Appellate Court will 
not overturn the findings of the Labor Commission unless they are "arbitrary and 
capricious," "wholly without cause", or without substantial evidence to support them. 
Kerans v. Industrial Commission. 713 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1986). Agency factual findings 
will not be overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if another conclusion is 
permissible. Whitear v. Labor Commission, 973 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
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Issue 2: Did the Labor Commission properly determine that Pinnacle Homes was 
an "employer" within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-103 (2), allowing 
Pinnacle Homes to be found to be the statutory employer of Mr. Ebmeyer under Utah 
Code Annotated §34A-2-103(7)? 
Standard of Review: Generally, "matters of statutory construction are questions 
of law that are reviewed for correctness." Esquivel v. Labor Commission, 7 P.3d 777 
(Utah 2000). The determination of this issue is not confined to only statutory 
interpretation, but also involves the application of the terms of Utah Code Annotated 
§34A-2-103 to the particular facts of this case. 
The Utah Labor Commission has been granted broad discretion by the Legislature 
to determine the facts and apply the law. Section 34A-1-301(1997) of the Utah Code 
expressly provides that "[t]he commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, 
and authority to determine the facts and apply the law in this chapter or any other title or 
chapter it administers." When the governing statute makes an explicit grant of discretion 
to [an agency, the appellate court] appl[ies] a reasonableness and rationality standard, and 
may only overturn the [agency's] conclusions of law if they are unreasonable and 
irrational." Bernard v. Motor Vehicle Division, 905 P.2d317, 320 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
In workers compensation cases such as the instant matter, involving mixed 
questions of law and fact, the findings and conclusions of the Labor Commission are 
entitled to great deference. The determination of the Labor Commission must be upheld 
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"unless the determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality so as to 
constitute an abuse of discretion under section 63-46b-16(h)(i) of the UAPA." Ae 
Clevite, Inc. v. Labor Commission, 996 P.2d 1072, 1073 (Utah Ct. App. 2000), 
cert den. 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah, 2000). Therefore, the Court will not overturn the findings 
of a workers compensation case, "unless they are arbitrary and capricious, or wholly 
without cause, or contrary to the one [inevitable] conclusion from the 
evidence." McKesson Corp. v. Labor Commission, 41 P.3d 468, 473 (Utah Ct. App. 
2002) quoting from Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
Preservation for Appeal: Respondent acknowledges that the issue of whether 
Pinnacle Homes was his statutory employer was raised by Petitioner before the Utah 
Labor Commission. A Petition for Review was timely filed with this Court. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated §§34A-2-103 (2001) and 34A-2-104 (2001) are the 
applicable statutes. The "statutory employer" provision is found in Section 103 (7)(a) 
which states: 
If any person who is an employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part 
for the employer by a contractor over whose work the employer retains supervision 
or control, and this work is a part or process in the trade or business of the 
employer, the contractor, all persons employed by the contractor, all subcontractors 
under the contractor, and all persons employed by any of these subcontractors, are 
considered employees of the original employer for the purposes of this chapter and 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
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Section 104 (4) allows corporate directors to opt out of workers compensation 
coverage and provides: 
(a) A corporation may elect not to include any director or officer of the corporation 
as an employee under this chapter and Chapter 3. 
(b) If a corporation makes an election under Subsection (4) (a), the corporation 
shall serve written notice upon its insurance carrier naming the persons to be 
excluded from coverage. 
(c) A director or officer of a corporation is considered an employee under this 
chapter and Chapter 3 until the notice described in Subsection (4) (b) is given. 
The statutes are set forth in full in the Addendum hereto. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. Ebmeyer was employed by Platinum Builders as a shingler on new 
home construction beginning January of 2003. (AR 227: P20, L16 through P21, L20). 
2. Mr. Ebmeyer received his work from Mel Beagley of Platinum Builders. 
(AR 227: P28, L22 through P29, L10). 
3. After Mr. Ebmeyer received the call to appear for work, Mr. Ebmeyer 
usually arrived at the worksite and the worksite was already stocked and ready for work. 
(AR227:P29,L13-L24.) 
4. Mr. Ebmeyer did not work for anyone other than Platinum Builders during 
the relevant time period from January of 2003 to the date of injury in August of 2003. 
(AR 227: P31, L2 through P32, L3.) 
5. Mr. Ebmeyer testified that no one from Pinnacle Homes came to the 
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Saratoga Springs house he was working on while he was there. (AR 227: P36, L20 
through P37,L8.) 
6. Mr. Ebmeyer worked on four (4) houses for Pinnacle Homes - possibly six 
(6) total. (AR 227: P42, L24 through P43, L3.) 
7. Mr. Ebmeyer testified he did not know if Pinnacle ever inspected his work 
or not. (AR 227: P58, L20-L25.) 
8. After his injury, Mr. Ebmeyer dealt with Mel Beagley of Platinum Builders 
with respect to reporting the injury and obtaining his last paycheck. (AR 227: P45, L9 
through P465L2.) 
9. Mr. Ebmeyer received no checks from Pinnacle Homes. (AR 227: P54, L5-
L9. 
10. Mr. Bbmeyer received no materials from Pinnacle Homes. (AR 227: P54, 
L10-L13. 
11. Mr. Ebmeyer received no tools or other supplies from Pinnacle Homes. 
(AR227:P54,L14-L17.) 
12. Mr. Ebmeyer received no training from Pinnacle Homes. (AR 227: P57, 
L12-L20.) 
13. A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Platinum Builders, a 
general contractor, had been hired to put roofs on the houses that Pinnacle owned. (AR 
227:P76,L13-L23.) 
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14. A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that upon inquiry Mel 
Beagley of Platinum Builders advised that Beagley had opted out of workers 
compensation coverage. (AR 227: P79, L7 - L14.) 
15. A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Pinnacle was not aware 
that anyone other than Mel Beagley and Platinum Builders was doing the roofs on the 
houses owned by Pinnacle. (AR 227: P80, L8 - L12.) 
16. A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Mr. Beagley and 
Platinum Builders were not paid by the hour, but were paid on a lump sum contract. (AR 
227:P80,L13-L18.) 
17. A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Pinnacle is in the 
business of selling new homes to clients who contract with Pinnacle to provide them a 
house. Pinnacle "will buy the land and spec a home on it." (AR 227: P87, L2 - L22.) 
18. A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Pinnacle subdivided its 
operations among subcontractors, contracting with Platinum Builders to do a portion and 
doing the same with the framing, plumbing, and so on. There was no general contractor 
who oversaw each aspect of the building of the house.(AR 227: P85, L5 - L13.) 
19. A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that when the corporation is 
subcontracting all of the work on a house, it decides if the subcontractors should be paid. 
And the corporation goes out and inspects to make sure the work is completed. (AR 227: 
P92,L10-L19.) 
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20. A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Pinnacle does not pay 
an invoice for work unless the work is done. (AR 227: P98, L24 - L25.) 
21. A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that if it received a 
complaint from a homeowner that the roof on one of their houses leaked, it would be the 
responsibility of the contractor to make the repair. (AR 227: P93, L9 - L16.) 
22. Mr. Ebmeyer testified that while working on a different house for Pinnacle 
Homes prior to his accident he was approached by someone in a Pinnacle truck and asked 
when Mel was going to fix the leaking roof across the street. (AR 227: P40, L6 - L20.) 
23. A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Pinnacle did not direct 
or control Mel Beagley or Platinum Builders regarding how the work was done and left 
the inspections of the houses to the cities. (AR 227: P98, L14 through P99, L4.) 
24. A representative from Pinnacle Homes testified that Pinnacle does not have 
any employees and does not do any of the physical work on the houses it owns. (AR 227: 
P95,L23 through P96,L6.) 
25. Pinnacle Homes filed its application with the insurance agent notifying her 
that it did not have any employees and told the insurance agent that Pinnacle wanted to 
opt out of workers compensation coverage. (AR 227: P96, L12 through P97, L21.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Labor Commission properly determined that Pinnacle Homes was an 
"employer" within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-103(2), because an 
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employer is defined as a person "who regularly employs one or more workers or 
operatives in the same business". Although Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-104(4) allows 
the corporate officers and directors of Pinnacle Homes to opt out of workers 
compensation coverage, the Labor Commission appropriately found that Pinnacle failed 
to provide the required written notice to its workers compensation carrier. Even if 
Pinnacle had successfully opted out of the coverage requirement pursuant to §104(4), 
Pinnacle's argument that it would not be an "employer" under the "statutory employer" 
provision of §103(7) (a) is incorrect. 
The Labor Commission Order granting Mr. Ebmeyer benefits from the employer, 
Platinum Builders and the statutory employer, Pinnacle Homes was reasonable and 
rational. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN 
SUPPORT OF THE LABOR COMMISSION ORDER AND THUS 
HAS FAILED IN ITS DUTY ON APPEAL 
If Pinnacle Homes wants to challenge the Order of the Labor Commission, it is 
required to marshal all of the evidence supporting the agency's findings and show that 
despite supporting facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, the 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence given the record as a whole. Hales 
Sand and Granite, Inc. V. Audit Division, 842 P.2d 887, 893 (Utah 1992). Pinnacle 
Homes has totally failed to do so. 
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It is well established that a party challenging a finding of fact of a lower Court or 
an administrative agency has the burden of establishing that those findings are not 
supported by the evidence and thus, are clearly erroneous. See , Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); 
Cambelt International Corp. V. Dalton. 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1987). In order to 
successfully challenge a finding of fact of a trial court or administrative agency on appeal, 
a petitioner/appellant must list all evidence supporting the findings and demonstrate that 
the evidence is inadequate to sustain the findings, when viewed in a light most favorable 
to the court or agency below. See , Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 
1998). 
The Courts of Utah have stated that the marshaling process is like being the devil's 
advocate. A petitioner/appellant may not merely present selected evidence favorable to 
his or her position without presenting any of the evidence supporting the findings of the 
lower court or agency. See, Whitear v. Labor Commission, 973 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998). 
In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger 
must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings appellant resists. 
After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger 
must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be 
sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the 
evidence is clearly erroneous. 
West Vallev Citv v. Majestic Inventory Co., 812P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Marshaling the evidence on an appeal is a process fundamentally different from 
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that of presenting of presenting the claim at the hearing. As explained by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Chen v. Stewart. 100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004): 
Appellants cannot merely present carefully selected facts and excerpts from the 
record in support of their position [citing cases]. Nor can they simply restate or 
review evidence that points to an alternate finding or a finding contrary to the trial 
court's finding of fact [citing cases]. Furthermore, appellants cannot shift the 
burden of marshaling by falsely claiming that there is no evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings. Id. at 1195. 
The Court went on to emphasize that: "If the marshaling requirement is not met, 
the appellate court has grounds to affirm the court's findings on that basis alone "and "we 
assume that the evidence supports the trial court's findings." Id.at 1196. See also. 
Merriam v. Industrial Commission. 812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Featherstone 
v. Industrial Commission. 877 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Pinnacle Homes has not even attempted to marshal the evidence in favor of the 
Order of the Labor Commission. Rather, they have merely recited facts favorable to their 
position, while making the conclusional statement that there is no substantial evidence to 
support the findings of the Labor Commission. When a petitioner/appellant fails or 
refuses to meet the heavy burden of marshaling the evidence, appellate courts are bound 
to assume the record supports the factual findings of the lower court or administrative 
agency. In fact, appellate courts have shown no reluctance to affirm when the 
petitioner/appellant fails to meet its marshaling burden. See. Wade v. Stangl. 869 P.2d 
9,12 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
As a result of the failure of Pinnacle Homes to marshal the evidence in this matter 
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its Petition for Review should be dismissed. To rule otherwise would allow any party on 
appeal to supplant findings of the lower court or administrative agency with that parties' 
own purported findings without marshaling evidence or satisfying the substantial 
evidence test. 
II. THE LABOR COMMISSION CORRECTLY FOUND THAT 
PINNACLE HOMES WAS AN "EMPLOYER" UNDER UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED §34A-2-104 (4), 
Pinnacle Homes argues that the Labor Commission erred when it found that 
Pinnacle was an "employer" under §34A-2-104 (4). This section of the Utah Workers 
Compensation Act allows corporate officers and directors to opt out of the required 
workers compensation coverage, provided they " . . . serve written notice upon its 
insurance carrier naming the persons to be excluded from coverage." A representative 
from Pinnacle testified Pinnacle Homes filed its application with the insurance agent 
notifying her that it did not have any employees and told the insurance agent that Pinnacle 
wanted to opt out of workers compensation coverage. (AR 227: P96, L12 through P97, 
L21.) The Labor Commission relied upon the opinion in Olsen v. Mclntyre Investment 
Co., 956 P.2d 257 (Utah 1998) as guidance for concluding that"... corporations must 
strictly comply with §104(4)(b)'s requirements for exclusion of officers and directors 
from coverage." See, Order Denying Motion for Review, AR 217-222, Page 3. Based on 
the foregoing, the Labor Commission appropriately found that Pinnacle did not provide 
the required written notice to its workers compensation insurance carrier, and that the 
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officers and directors of Pinnacle remained employee of the corporation, and as such 
Pinnacle was an employer subject to the "statutory employer" provision of §34A-1-
103(7). Id. at Pages 3-4. 
Even if Pinnacle had successfully opted out of the coverage requirement of 
§104(4), Pinnacle's argument that because it had no employees, it was not an "employer" 
under the "statutory employer" provision of §103 (7) (a) is flawed. Pinnacle assumes 
that compliance with §104(4)'s opting out provision eliminates Pinnacle's status as an 
"employer". However, Pinnacle's reading of that provision is too expansive, in that 
§104(4) does not state that a corporation that exempts officers and directors from 
coverage is not an "employer" per §103(7)(a). Rather, the language of that provision is 
specifically limited to the issue of workers compensation insurance coverage for 
corporate officers and directors. It is presumed that the Legislature allowed such opting 
out of directors and officers to allow high paid executives to pursue more generous 
benefits than offered by workers compensation and its statutory maximum. 
Pinnacle Homes takes the erroneous position that Section 34A-2-104(4) defines 
whether a person or entity is an "employer" for workers compensation purposes. 
Petitioner's Brief at 18. However, that definition is found in Section 34A-2-103(2) of the 
Act which defines "employer " as " . . . each person . . . who regularly employs one or 
more workers or operatives in the same business,... under any contract of hire [.]" 
Section 103(2)(b) indicates: " 'Regularly ' includes all employments in the usual course 
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of the . . . business . . . of the employer " [.] According to the Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary ,Page 1686, (1986) a "person " is defined as: "a human being, a 
body of persons, or a corporation, partnership, or other legal entity that is recognized by 
law as the subject of rights and duties." 
If, arguendo, the officers and directors of Pinnacle Homes opt out of workers 
compensation coverage, Pinnacle is nonetheless still an "employer " as set forth in 
§103(2) because it is still a corporation/person which "regularly" employs ". . .one or 
more operatives in the same business... "In other words, Pinnacle Homes as a 
corporation does not cease to exist just because its officers and directors may decide to 
opt out of workers compensation coverage. The officers and directors of Pinnacle 
Homes, who are also workers or operatives, legally continue to pursue the business of 
Pinnacle, which is buying the land and building new spec homes for clients. (AR 227: 
P87, L2 -L22.) Pinnacle regularly employs one or more operatives or subcontractors to 
build all aspects of its houses, in the usual course of its business. (AR 227: P85, L5- L13.) 
Therefore, a conclusion that Pinnacle is an "employer " as defined in §103(2) is not only 
reasonable but inevitable; and since Pinnacle is an "employer " it can also be a "statutory 
employer ". 
A. PINNACLE HOMES WAS ALSO THE EMPLOYER OF MR. 
EBMEYER UNDER THE TRADITIONAL "RIGHT TO 
CONTROL " TEST. 
The Administrative Law Judge also found that Mr. Ebmeyer was a statutory 
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employee of Pinnacle Homes. The "statutory employer" provision of the Act is found in 
Section 103 (7)(a) which states: 
If any person who is an employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part 
for the employer by a contractor over whose work the employer retains supervision 
or control, and this work is a part or process in the trade or business of the 
employer, the contractor, all persons employed by the contractor, all subcontractors 
under the contractor, and all persons employed by any of these subcontractors, are 
considered employees of the original employer for the purposes of this chapter and 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
The leading Utah case applying the concept of "statutory employer " is Bennett v. 
Industrial Commission. 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986). In Bennett the Supreme Court 
observed: 
According to Professor Larson, statutes of this kind were passed "to protect 
employees of irresponsible and uninsured subcontractors by imposing ultimate 
liability on the presumably responsible principal contractor, who has it within his 
power, in choosing subcontractors, to pass upon their responsibility and insist upon 
appropriate compensation protection for their workers."(tite omitted) A secondary 
purpose of these statutes was "to forestall evasion of [workers compensation acts] 
by those who might be tempted to subdivide their regular operations among 
subcontractors, thus escaping direct employment relations with the workers.. .Id. 
at 431. (cite omitted). 
The Court ruled that" . . . a subcontractor's employee is deemed an employee of 
the general contractor if (1) the general contractor retains some supervision or control 
over the subcontractor's work, and (2) the work done by the subcontractor is a 'part or 
process in the trade or business of the employers.'" Id. at 431 (citations omitted). In 
addition, the Court went on to find that "[a] subcontractor's work is 'part or process in the 
trade or business of the employer ' if it is part of the operations which directly relate to 
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the successful performance of the general contractor's commercial enterprise." See 
Bennett, 726 P.2d at 431. The Court also addressed the requirement that the general 
contractor as a "statutory employer " retain "supervision and control" of the 
subcontractor's work by stating: 
In dealing with "statutory " employees, the statute begins with the proposition that 
the claimant qualifies as an employee of the subcontractor. But the statutory 
requirement that the general contractor have "supervision or control" over the 
work of the subcontractor cannot mean that the subcontractor must also qualify as 
an employee of the general contractor. That would be at least highly improbable 
and perhaps impossible by definition. Rather, the term "supervision or control" 
requires only that the general contractor retain ultimate control over the project. Id. 
at 431-432 (cite omitted). 
* * * 
Although the construction process requires the general contractor to delegate to a 
greater or lesser degree to subcontractors, the general contractor remains 
responsible for successful completion of the entire project and of necessity retains 
the right to require that subcontractors perform according to specifications. The 
power to supervise or control the ultimate performance of subcontractors satisfies 
the requirement that the general contractor retain supervision or control over the 
subcontractor, (cite omitted) Therefore, as long as a subcontractor's work is a part 
or process of the general contractor's business, an inference arises that the general 
contractor has retained supervision or control over the subcontractor sufficient to 
meet the requirement of §[34A-2-103(7)(a)]. Id. at 432 (cite omitted). 
In the case at bar, Mr. Ebmeyer was hired by Mel Beagley of Platinum Builders as 
a shingler. (AR 227: P20, L16 through P21, L20). Mr. Beagley held a general contractor's 
license but his main business was roofing. (AR 227: P78, L16 through P79, LI). 
Pinnacle Homes builds and sells new "spec" homes. (AR227: P87,L2-L22). It 
subcontracts out all phases of the new home construction. (AR 227: P85, L5 - LI 3). 
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Towards this end, Pinnacle let a subcontract to Platinum to install roofs on its houses in 
the Saratoga Springs housing development. (AR 227: P76, L13 - L23). In effect, 
Pinnacle is the "general contractor" on its jobs, because they have elected not to hire a 
licensed general contractor to oversee all aspects of the construction of their homes. (AR 
227: P85, L5 - L13). The roofing work performed by Platinum Builders is absolutely 
necessary for the successful completion of the commercial enterprise of Pinnacle Homes, 
because Pinnacle cannot sell a new house without a roof. Therefore, clearly roofing is a 
"part or process in the trade or business of the employer, " which as it pertains to Pinnacle 
is the building and selling of new houses. 
The Administrative Law Judge found that Pinnacle Homes decided which 
subcontractors to hire to build its houses. An officer of Pinnacle testified that it decided 
which subcontractors would get paid, and that they would inspect the work for 
completion. (AR 227: P92, L10 - L19). If Pinnacle Homes received a complaint from 
one of their customers about a leaking roof, the roofing contractor would be responsible 
for the repair. (AR 227: P93, L9- LI6). So, while Pinnacle may have delegated the 
roofing of the house to Platinum, Pinnacle remained ultimately responsible for the 
successful completion of the house for their customer. By necessity, Pinnacle has and 
had the right to require that its subcontractors perform according to its contractual 
specifications. Therefore, "[t]he power to supervise or control the ultimate performance 
of subcontractors satisfies the requirement that the general contractor retain supervision 
19 
or control over the subcontractor." See Bennett, 726 P.2d at 432. 
The Court in Bennett concluded by noting: 
.. .that the remedial purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act supports the 
conclusion that §[34A-2-103(7)(a)] should be construed in favor of protecting the 
employee, (citations omitted) The Arizona Supreme Court in construing an 
almost identical statutory provision, has stated that it "is a legislatively created 
scheme by which conceded nonemployees are deliberately brought within the 
coverage of the [Workmen's Compensation] Act." Id. at 432 (cite omitted). 
In light of the foregoing public policy statement, it cannot be fairly said that the 
Legislature intended to create a "safe harbor "for the comparmentalization of businesses. 
To find otherwise, would be inconsistent with the overarching concern of preventing 
evasion of the Workers Compensation Act expressed in the Section 34a-2-103. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ebmeyer's injuries were suffered in the course and scope of his employment 
with Platinum Builders. On the date of his injury he was engaged in activities that were 
"a part or process in the . . .business of" Pinnacle Homes, making it reasonable and 
rational for the Labor Commission to find that Pinnacle was the "statutory employer " of 
Mr. Ebmeyer. The Order of the Utah Labor Commission below, should be affirmed. 
DATED this 13th day of March, 2007. 
Timothy C. Ajkn 
CounsShf6flGlen M. Ebmeyer 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated, §34A-2-103 (2001) 
Utah Code Annotated, §34A-2-104 (2001) 
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JL,U WOKKERS' COMPENSATION ACT 34A-2-103 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
_ . J . S . — 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 1. 
A.L.R. — Suicide as compensable under Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, 15 A.L.R.3d 616. 
Workmen's compensation: injury sustained while attending 
employer-sponsored social affair as arising out of and in the 
course of employment, 47 A.L.R.3d 566. 
Employer's liability for injury caused by food or drink 
purchased by employee in plant facilities, 50 A.L.R.3d 505. 
Workers' compensation law as precluding employee's suit 
against employer for third person's criminal attack, 49 
A.L.R.4th 926. 
Workers' compensation: sexual assaults as compensable, 52 
A.L.R.4th 731. 
Workers' compensation: injuries incurred during labor ac-
tivity, 61 A.L.R.4th 196. 
Workers' compensation: injuries incurred while traveling to 
or from work with employer's receipts, 63 A.L.R.4th 253. 
Workers' compensation: coverage of employee's injury or 
death from exposure to the elements — modern cases, 20 
A.L.R.5th 346. 
Workers'compensation: Lyme disease, 22 A.L.R.5th 246. 
Employer's liability to employee or agent for injury or death 
resulting from assault or criminal attack by third person, 40 
A.L.R.5th 1. 
Presumption or inference that accidental death of employee 
engaged in occupation of manufacturing or processing arose 
out of and in course of employment, 47 A.L.R.5th 801. 
34A-2-103. Employers enumerated and defined — 
Regularly employed — Statutory employers . 
(1) (a) The state, and each county, city, town, and school 
district in the state are considered employers under this 
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(b) For the purposes of the exclusive remedy in this 
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act 
prescribed in Sections 34A-2-105 and 34A-3-102, the state 
is considered to be a single employer and includes any 
office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, 
institution, hospital, college, university, or other instru-
mentality of the state. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (4), each person, 
including each public utility and each independent contractor, 
who regularly employs one or more workers or operatives in 
the same business, or in or about the same establishment, 
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, 
is considered an employer under this chapter and Chapter 3, 
Utah Occupational Disease Act. As used in this Subsection (2): 
(a) "Independent contractor" means any person en-
gaged in the performance of any work for another who, 
while so engaged, is: 
(i) independent of the employer in all that pertains 
to the execution of the work; 
(ii) not subject to the routine rule or control of the 
. employer; 
(iii) engaged only in the performance of a definite 
job or piece of work; and 
(iv) subordinate to the employer only in effecting a 
result in accordance with the employer's design. 
(b) "Regularly" includes all employments in the usual 
course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of 
the employer, whether continuous throughout the year or 
for only a portion of the year. 
(3) (a) The client company in an employee leasing arrange-
ment under Title 58, Chapter 59, Professional Employer 
Organization Licensing Act, is considered the employer of 
leased employees and shall secure workers' compensation 
benefits for them by complying with Subsection 34A-2-
201(1) or (2) and commission rules. 
(b) Insurance carriers may underwrite workers' com-
pensation secured in accordance with Subsection (3)(a) 
showing the leasing company as the named insured and 
each client company as an additional insured by means of 
individual endorsements. 
(c) Endorsements shall be filed with the division as 
directed by commission rule. 
(d) The division shall promptly inform the Division of 
Occupation and Professional Licensing within the Depart-
ment of Commerce if the division has reason to believe 
tha t an employee leasing company is not in compliance 
v/ith Subsection 34A-2-20K1) or (2) and commission rules. 
(4) A domestic employer who does not employ one employee 
or more than one employee at least 40 hours per week is not 
considered an employer under this chapter and Chapter 3, 
Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(5) (a) As used in this Subsection (5): 
(i) (A) "agricultural employer" means a person 
who employs agricultural labor as defined in 
Subsections 35A-4-206(l) and (2) and does not 
include employment as provided in Subsection 
35A-4-206(3); and 
(B) notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a)(i)(A), 
only for purposes of determining who is a mem-
ber of the employer's immediate family under 
Subsection (5)(a)(ii), if the agricultural employer 
is a corporation, partnership, or other business 
entity, "agricultural employer" means an officer, 
director, or par tner of the business entity; 
(ii) "employer's immediate family" means: 
(A) a n agricultural employer's*. 
(I) spouse; 
(II) grandparent; 
(III) parent; 
(IV) sibling; 
(V) child; 
(VI) grandchild; 
(VII) nephew; or 
(VIII) niece; 
(B) a spouse of any person provided in Subsec-
tion (5)(a)(ii)(A)(II) through (VIII); or 
(C) an individual who is similar to those listed 
in Subsections (5)(a)(ii)(A) or (B) as defined by 
rules of the commission; and 
(iii) "non-immediate family" means a person who is 
not a member of the employer's immediate family. 
(b) For purposes of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, an agricultural employer is not 
considered an employer of a member of the employer's 
immediate family. 
(c) For purposes of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, an agricultural employer is not 
considered an employer of a non-immediate family em-
ployee if: 
(i) for the previous calendar year the agricultural 
employer's total annual payroll for all non-immediate 
family employees was less than $8,000; or 
(ii) (A) for the previous calendar year the agricul-
tural employer's total annual payroll for all non-
immediate family employees was equal to or 
greater than $8,000 but less than $50,000; and 
(B) the agricultural employer maintains in-
surance tha t covers job-related injuries of the 
employer's non-immediate family employees in 
at least the following amounts: 
(I) $300,000 liability insurance, as de-
fined in Section 31A-1-301; and 
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(II) $5,000 for health care benefits similar 
to benefits under health care insurance as 
defined in Section 31A-1-301. 
(d) For purposes of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act, an agricultural employer is 
considered an employer of a non-immediate family em-
ployee if: 
(i) for the previous calendar year the agricultural 
employer's total annual payroll for all non-immediate 
family employees is equal to or greater than $50,000; 
or 
(ii) (A) for the previous year the agricultural em-
ployer's total payroll for non-immediate family 
employees was equal to or exceeds $8,000 but is 
less than $50,000; and 
(B) the agricultural employer fails to maintain 
the insurance required under Subsection 
(5)(c)(ii). 
(6) An employer of agricultural laborers or domestic ser-
vants who is not considered an employer under this chapter 
and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, may come 
under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease 
Act, by complying with: 
(a) this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act; and 
(b) the rules of the commission. 
(7) (a) If any person who is an employer procures any work 
to be done wholly or in part for the employer by a 
contractor over whose work the employer retains super-
vision or control, and this work is a part or process in the 
trade or business of the employer, the contractor, all 
persons employed by the contractor, all subcontractors 
under the contractor, and all persons employed by any of 
these subcontractors, are considered employees of the 
original employer for the purposes of this chapter and 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(b) Any person who is engaged in constructing, improv-
ing, repairing, or remodelling a residence that the person 
owns or is in the process of acquiring as the person's 
personal residence may not be considered an employee or 
employer solely by operation of Subsection (7)(a). 
(c) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a sole 
proprietorship may not be considered an employee under 
Subsection (7)(a) if the employer who procures work to be 
done by the partnership or sole proprietorship obtains 
and relies on either: 
(i) a valid certification of the partnership's or sole 
proprietorship's compliance with Section 34A-2-201 
indicating that the partnership or sole proprietorship 
secured the payment of workers' compensation ben-
efits pursuant to Section 34A-2-201; or 
(ii) if a partnership or sole proprietorship with no 
employees other than a partner of the partnership or 
owner of the sole proprietorship, a workers' compen-
sation policy issued by an insurer pursuant to Sub-
section 31A-21-104(8) stating that: 
(A) the partnership or sole proprietorship is 
customarily engaged in an independently estab-
lished trade, occupation, profession, or business; 
and 
(B) the partner or owner personally waives 
the partner's or owner's entitlement to the ben-
efits of this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occu-
pational Disease Act, in the operation of the 
partnership or sole proprietorship. 
(d) A director or officer of a corporation may not be 
considered an employee under Subsection (7)(a) if the 
director or officer is excluded .from coverage under Sub-
section 34A-2-104(4). 
(e) A contractor or subcontractor is not an employee of -
the employer under Subsection (7)(a), if the employer who 
procures work to be done by the contractor or subcontrac-
tor obtains and relies on either: 
(i) a valid certification of the contractor's or sub-
contractor's compliance with Section 34A-2-201; or 
(ii) if a partnership, corporation, or sole proprietor-
ship with no employees other than a partner of the 
partnership, officer of the corporation, or owner of the 
sole proprietorship, a workers' compensation policy 
issued by an insurer pursuant to Subsection 31A-21-
104(8) stating that: 
(A) the partnership, corporation, or sole pro-
prietorship is customarily engaged in an inde-
pendently established trade, occupation, profes-
sion, or business; and 
(B) the partner, corporate officer, or owner 
personally waives the partner's, corporate offi-
cer's, or owner's entitlement to the benefits of 
this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act, in the operation of the partnership's, 
corporation's, or sole proprietorship's enterprise 
under a contract of hire for services. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 50; C.L. 1917, § 3110; L. 1919, 
ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 1933, 42-1-40; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 
42-1-40; L. 1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1975, ch. 101, § 1; 1983, ch. 355, 
§ 1; 1986, ch. 211, § 3; 1988, ch. 109, § 1; 1992, ch. 178, § 2; 
1993, ch. 106, § 1; 1993, ch. 140, § 1; 1995, ch. 20, § 77; 1995, 
ch. 307, § 1; 1996, ch. 190, § 2; C. 1953, 35-1-42; renumbered 
by L. 1996, ch. 240, § 107; 1997, ch. 201, § 1; renumbered by 
L. 1997, ch. 375, § 85; 1998, ch. 277, § 2; 1999, ch. 55, §§ 2,3; 
1999, ch. 199, §§ 1, 2; 2001, ch. 116, § 192. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment by ch. 106, 
effective May 3, 1993, in Subsection (1), added the (a) desig-
nation and added Subsection (1Kb). 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 20, effective May 1, 1995, 
substituted "35-2-102" for "35-2-3" in Subsection (l)(b). 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 307, effective May 1, 1995, 
deleted a reference to Section 35-2-3 in Subsection (l)(b); 
added "for the purposes of Chapters 1 and.2" in Subsection 
(6)(a); deleted Subsections (6)(b) and (c), discussing general 
contractors and subcontractors, and redesignated Subsection 
(6)(d) as (b) and (6)(e) as (c); rewrote Subsections (6XcXi) and 
(ii), which formerly discussed employee status under Subsec-
tion 35-l-43(3)(a); deleted Subsection (6Xf), establishing a 
presumption that partners and sole proprietors "had or shared 
control or responsibility for any failure to insure or otherwise 
provide adequate payment of direct compensation," and redes-
ignated Subsection (6)(g) as (d), substituting "35-1-43(4)" for 
"35-l-43(3)(b)"; added a new Subsection (6)(e); and made 
numerous related and stylistic changes. 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 190, effective April 29, 1996, 
inserted "routine" in Subsection (2)(b) and rewrote Subsection 
(6). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 240, effective July 1, 1997, 
renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as § 35-1-
42, and substituted "chapter" for "title" throughout, "Section 
35A-3-105" for "Sections 35-1-60 and 35-2-102" in Subsection 
(1Kb), "35A-3-201" for "35-1-46" in Subsections (3Xa), (6)(cXi) 
and (ii), and (6)(e), "department" for "commission" in Subsec-
tions (3)(a), (3)(c), and (5), "this chapter and Chapter 3a" for 
"Chapters 1 and 2" in Subsection (6)(a), and "35A-3-104(4)" for 
"35-1-43(4)" in Subsection (6)(d). 
The 1997 amendment by ch. 201, effective July 1, 1997, 
added Subsection (3)(d) (see Coordination Clause below). 
The 1997 amendment by ch. 375, effective July 1, 1997, 
renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as § 35A-
3-103; inserted references to "Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
34A-2-104 UTAH LABOR CODE 32 
ence with work is unnecessary, since it is the right to interfere 
that determines relationship. Ludlow v. Industrial Comm'n, 
65 Utah 168, 235 P. 884 (1925). 
Another or additional test approved by Supreme Court is 
that one is an independent contractor when he can employ 
others to do the work and accomphsh the contemplated result 
without the consent of the contractee. Gogoff v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 77 Utah 355, 296 P. 229 (1931). 
Test whether employer retains supervision over work of 
contractor so as to make contractor and his employees under 
this section employees of employer is whether employer has 
right of supervision whether he exercises such right or not. 
Utah Fire Clay Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 86 Utah 1, 40 P.2d 
183(1935). 
While it is true that manner and basis of payment of 
compensation is one element to be considered in determining 
whether claimant is employee or independent contractor, it is 
by no means conclusive. Stover Bedding Co. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 99 Utah 423,107 P.2d 1027, 134 A.L.R. 1006 (1940). 
Whether a workman is an "employee" or an "independent 
contractor" is dependent on (1) whether the employer has the 
right to control his execution of the work, (2) whether the work 
done or to be done is a part or process in the trade or business 
of the employer, and (3) whether the work done or to be done 
is a definite job or piece of work. Parkinson v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 110 Utah 309,172 P.2d 136 (1946); Ewer v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 112 Utah 538, 189 P.2d 959 (1948). 
The most important of the determinatives of the relation-
ship between workman and employer is that of control. The 
existence of a potential right to control is sufficient to create 
the relationship even though that right is never exercised. 
Parkinson v. Industrial Comm'n, 110 Utah 309, 172 P.2d 136 
(1946). 
Extent of control is the important test in determining status 
of one as "employee" or "independent contractor," under this 
section. Christean v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 Utah 451, 196 
P.2d 502 (1948). 
"Independent calling" or "own business" test is not followed 
in Utah. Christean v. Industrial Comm'n, 113 Utah 451, 196 
R2d 502 (1948). 
Crucial factor in determining whether applicant for work-
men's compensation is "employee" or "independent contractor" 
is whether person for whom services were performed had right 
to control execution of work. Sommerville v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 113 Utah 504, 196 P.2d 718 (1948). 
In determining who is the employer of an employee, the 
right to control the employee's work is dispositive of the 
question; the degree of control actually exercised need not be 
great, so long as the right exists. Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 
R2d 1286 (Utah 1976). 
Cited in RDG Associates/Jorman Corp. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 741 P.2d 948 (Utah 1987); Riddle v. Mays, 780 P.2d 
1252 (Utah 1989); Gordon v. CRS Consulting EngYs, Inc., 820 
P.2d 492 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Goheen v. Yellow Freight Sys., 
32 F.3d 1450 (10th Cir. 1994). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments in Utah Law 
— Statutory Enactments — Labor Law, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 
374. 
Recent Legislative Developments in Utah Law: Workers' 
Compensation Coverage Amendments, 1996 Utah L. Rev. 
1350. 
C.J.S. — 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation §§ 37 to 58. 
A.L.R. — Right to maintain direct action against fellow 
employee for injury or death covered by workmen's compen-
sation, 21 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Employer's liability for negligence of employee in driving his 
or her own automobile, 27 A.L.R.5th 174. 
34A-2-104. '^Employee,* "worker," and "operative" de-
fined — Mining lessees and sublessees — Cor* 
porate officers and directors — Real estate 
agents and brokers — Prison inmates — In-
surance agents — Certain domestic workers. 
(1) As used in this chapter arid Chapter 3, Utah Occupa-
tional Disease Act, "employee," "worker," and "operative" 
mean: 
(a) (i) each elective and appointive officer and any 
other person: 
(A) in the service of: 
(I) the state; 
(II) a county, city, or town within the 
state; or 
(III) a school district within the state; 
(B) serving the state, or any county, city, town, 
or school district under: 
(I) an election; 
(II) appointment; or 
(III) any contract of hire, express or im-
plied, written or oral; and 
(ii) including: 
(A) an officer or employee of the state institu-
tions of learning; and 
(B) a member of the National Guard while on 
state active duty; and; 
(b) each person in the service of any employer, as 
defined in Section 34A-2-103, who employs one or more 
workers or operatives regularly in the same business, or 
in or about the same establishment: 
(i) under any contract of hire: 
(A) express or implied; and 
(B) oral or written; 
(ii) including aliens and minors, whether legally or 
illegally working for hire; and 
(iii) not including any person whose employment: 
(A) is casual; and 
(B) not in the usual course of the trade, busi-
ness, or occupation of the employee's employer. 
(2) (a) Unless a lessee provides coverage as an employer 
under this chapter and Chapter 3, any lessee in mines or 
of mining property and each employee and sublessee of 
the lessee shall be: 
(i) covered for compensation by the lessor under 
this chapter and Chapter 3; 
(ii) subject to this chapter and Chapter 3; and 
(iii) entitled to the benefits of this chapter and 
Chapter 3, to the same extent as if the lessee, 
employee, or sublessee were employees of the lessor 
drawing the wages paid employees for substantially 
similar work, 
(b) The lessor may deduct from the proceeds of ores 
mined by the lessees an amount equal to the insurance 
premium for that type of work. 
(3) (a) A partnership or sole proprietorship may elect to 
include any partner of the partnership or owner of the sole 
proprietorship as an employee of the partnership or sole 
proprietorship under this chapter and Chapter 3. 
(b) If a partnership or sole proprietorship makes an 
election under Subsection (3)(a), the partnership or sole 
proprietorship shall serve written notice upon its insur-
ance carrier naming the persons to be covered. 
(c) A partner of a partnership or owner of a sole 
proprietorship may not be considered an employee of the 
partner's partnership or the owner's sole proprietorship 
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£* under this chapter or Chapter 3 until the notice described 
\ in Subsection (3)(b) is given. 
(d) For premium rate making, the insurance carrier 
shall assume the salary or wage of the partner or sole 
r
 proprietor electing coverage under Subsection (3Xa) to be 
to 100% of the state's average weekly wage. 
(4) (a) A corporation may elect not to include any director 
& or officer of the corporation as an employee under this 
* chapter and Chapter 3. 
>* (b) If a corporation makes an election under Subsection 
(4)(a), the corporation shall serve written notice upon its 
insurance carrier naming the persons to be excluded from 
coverage. 
(c) A director or officer of a corporation is considered an 
employee under this chapter and Chapter 3 until the 
notice described in Subsection (4)(b) is given. 
(5) As used in this chapter and Chapter 3, "employee," 
"worker," and "operative" do not include: 
(a) a real estate sales agent or real estate broker, as 
defined in Section 61-2-2, who performs services in that 
capacity for a real estate broker if: 
(i) substantially all of the real estate sales agent's 
or associated broker's income for services is from real 
estate commissions; and 
(ii) the services of the real estate sales agent or 
associated broker are performed under a written 
contract that: 
(A) the real estate agent is an independent 
contractor; and 
(B) the real estate sales agent or associated 
broker is not to be treated as an employee for 
federal income tax purposes; 
(b) an offender performing labor under Section 64-
13-16 or 64-13-19, except as required by federal statute or 
regulation; 
(c) an individual who for an insurance agent or broker, 
as defined in Section 31A-1-301, solicits, negotiates, 
places or procures insurance if: 
(i) substantially all of the individual's income from 
those services is from insurance commissions; and 
(ii) the services of the individual are performed 
under a written contract that states that the indi-
vidual: 
(A) is an independent contractor; 
(6) is not to be treated as an employee for 
federal income tax purposes; and 
(C) can derive income from more than one 
insurance company; or 
(d) notwithstanding Subsection 34A-2-103(4), an indi-
vidual who provides domestic work for a person if: 
(i) the person for whom the domestic work is being 
provided receives or is eligible to receive the domestic 
work under a state or federal program designed to 
pay the costs of domestic work to prevent the person 
from being placed in: 
(A) an institution; or 
(B) a more restrictive placement than where 
that person resides at the time the person re-
ceives the domestic work; 
(ii) the individual is paid by a person designated by 
the Secretary of the Treasury in accordance with 
Section 3504, Internal Revenue Code, as a fiduciary, 
agent, or other person that has the control, receipt, 
custody, or disposal of, or pays the wages of the 
individual; and 
(iii) the domestic work is performed under a writ-
ten contract that notifies the individual that the 
individual is not an employee under this chapter or 
Chapter 3. 
(6) An individual described in Subsection (5)(d) may be-
come an employee under this chapter and Chapter 3 if the 
employer of the individual complies with: 
(a) this chapter and Chapter 3; and 
(b) commission rules. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 51; C.L. 1917, § 3111; L. 1919, 
ch. 63, § 1; 1925, ch. 73, § 1; R.S. 1933, 42-1-41; L. 1939, ch. 
51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-41; L. 1943, ch. 48, § 1; 1945, ch. 65, 
§ 1; 1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1957, ch. 62, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 
1975, ch. 101, § 2; 1984, ch. 76, § 1; 1985, ch. 75, § 1; 1986, 
ch. 211, § 4; 1988, ch. 109, § 2; 1993, ch. 106, § 2; 1993, ch. 
130, § 1; 1995, ch. 307, § 2; C. 1953, 35-1-43; renumbered by 
L. 1996, ch. 240, § 108; renumbered by L. 1997, ch. 375, § 86; 
1998, ch. 45, § 1; 2001, ch. 171, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective 
May 1, 1995, redesignated Subsection (3)(a) as (3), deleting a 
requirement to serve notice on the commission, replacing 
"150%" with "100%" and "employee" with "partner or sole 
proprietor electing coverage" in the last sentence, and making 
stylistic changes; redesignated Subsection (3)(b) as (4), delet-
ing a requirement to serve notice on the commission; redesig-
nated Subsection (4) as (5), adding "sales" before "agent" 
throughout the subsection; and redesignated Subsection (5) as 
(6). 
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered 
this section, which formerly appeared as § 35-1-43, and, in 
Subsection (l)(b), substituted "35A-3-103" for "35-1-42." 
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered 
this section, which formerly appeared as § 35A-3-104; in-
serted references to* "Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease 
Act" and "Chapter 3" throughout; deleted "or 'workmen'" and 
'or 'workman"' after "worker" in Subsections (1) and (5); 
substituted "34A-2-103" for "35A-3-103" in Subsection (l)(b); 
redesignated former Subsection (6) as Subsection (5Xb); and 
made stylistic changes. 
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, divided Sub-
section (5Xa)(ii), adding the (A) designation; deleted "specify-
ing" after "contract" in Subsection (5XaXii); redesignated 
former Subsection (5)(a)(iii) as (5)(a)(ii)(B); deleted "the con-
tract states that" at the beginning of Subsection (5XaXiiXB); 
added Subsection (5Xc); and made related changes throughout 
Subsection (5). 
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, added Sub-
sections (5Xd) and (6); subdivided Subsections (lXa), (lXb), 
and (2); in Subsections (3) and (4) divided Subsection (b) into 
(b) and (c); and made related and numerous stylistic changes. 
Federal Law. — The Internal Revenue Code, cited in 
Subsection (5Xd), is Title 26 of the U.S. Code. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Business of employer. 
Casual employee. 
Consideration for services. 
Contract of employment. 
Definitions. 
Employee. 
Employer. 
Establishment of relationship. 
Illegally employed minors. 
Injury out of state. 
Inmates. 
Joint employment. 
Lessor and lessee. 
Loaned employee. 
Master and servant. 
